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Foreword 
The Economic Transition and Integration (ETI) Project at the International Institute for Ap- 
plied Systems Analysis (IIASA) has built on the institute's tradition of promoting collaborative 
research between East and West. The ETI Project's proven ability in dealing with issues per- 
taining to the transformation from central planning to market economics has been valuable 
for policy-makers and scientists alike. As a result, the governement of the Russian Federation 
turned in 1992 to the ETI Project to organize a series of seminars and provide reports on top- 
ics of concern to the government. The Ford Foundation and the Pew Charitable Trusts have 
generously provided financial support for the seminar series. 
This report summarizes the contributions of participants at  two related seminars held at  
the request of the Russian government at  IIASA in the summer of 1993: Enterprise Behavior 
under Conditions of Economic Reform and Privatization of Large State Enterprises, both in the 
Russian Federation. 
Enterprise behavior, particularly of the large state enterprises that continue to dominate the 
Russian industrial and service sectors, is a crucial factor determining the success of economic 
reform. Somewhat surprisingly, the changing economic conditions have as yet to be accompanied 
by similarly sweeping alterations in firm behavior. The first of the two summer seminars focussed 
on why and how managerial attitudes and objectives, enterprise relationships, financial issues 
and taxation, foreign trade, and social welfare were significant in explaining present trends 
in enterprise behavior. Seminar participants searched out alternatives that would make these 
factors more conducive to promoting economic recovery and growth, and also compared the 
behavior of Russian enterprises with experiences in Poland and the Czech Republic. 
Privatization of large state enterprises is an integral part of the Russian economic transition. 
Vice Premier Anatoly Chubais opened the second workshop by reviewing the economic and po- 
litical history of Russian privatization efforts, summarizing recent developments, and outlining 
future plans. Potential and actual privatization influence managers' and firms' behavior before 
and after the process is undertaken. Further discussions were devoted to the legal and institu- 
tional environment, the restructuring and privatization interface, and a review of privatization 
techniques and experiences from Central and Eastern Europe. 
Once again, the seminar revealed an intense willingness of experts from Russia, Central and 
Eastern Europe, and the West to share their valuable experiences in an effort to find approaches 
to more optimally encourage the successful transition to a market economy. 
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Introduction 
This paper is the product of an on-going research effort based on an agreement between the 
government of the Russian Federation (RF) and the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria. The report endeavors to summarize 
presentations, papers, and discussions from the seminars "Enterprise Behavior under 
Conditions of Economic Refonn in the Russian Federation" and "Privatization of Large State 
Enterprises in the Russian Federation ", both organized by the Economic Transition and 
Integration (ETI) Project at IIASA in the summer of 1993. As was the case with the other 
seminars in this series, this meeting responded to a request of officials from the Russian 
government and fulfilled a policy oriented need. 
The conduct of enterprises during the transition to a market economy and the fluctuating 
conditions delineating motivations and incentives for enterprise managers are crucial elements 
determining the success of economic reform. As the conditions transform, so too must an 
enterprise's activity adjust over time. Decentralizing decision-making, abolishing strict 
central control, and liberalizing contracting, price setting, use of revenues and foreign trade 
are all new phenomena for enterprises, their management and employees. 
As if this were not challenging enough, it is simultaneous to the stagnation or recession of 
the Russian economy, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance resulting in a severe deterioration of the general economic climate to previously 
unknown magnitudes for the population. In addition, potential or rather imminent 
demonopolization, the related split-up of large firms, their corporatization and privatization 
create emerging uncertainties and possibilities that will inherently shape the pattern of 
enterprise activity and behavior. Relatively little is known of how firm managers perceive 
all these changes, which options they may consider in the decision-making process, and how 
they form policies when their firms are undergoing transition. In this paper we attempt to 
summarize these issues as they were presented and discussed by Russian, Western, and East 
European policy-makers and scholars at the first ETI summer seminar. 
In this frame, we do the same for the second seminar, which was organized for the purpose 
of investigating the more specific topic of privatizing large state enterprises in Russia and 
followed the first in both theme and time. These enterprises dominated and continue to 
dominate the nation's industrial and service sectors. While many researchers and policy- 
makers agree that the first step in the complex process of transformation should be 
commercialization and corporatization, it is, in fact, the subsequent move of creating ultimate 
responsible owners via the distribution of shares which is more difficult and controversial. 
The main reasons being the public's unfamiliarity with shareholding, few if any real financial 
intermediaries, low levels of savings by the population, and reluctancy of foreign investors 
to enter the unstable Russian market. The terms manager and owner, and the type of 
relationship and division of responsibilities will take on a whole new quality and significance 
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-- certainly distinct from their Soviet definitions but presumably not identical to their 
standard market meanings. The problem is further compounded by disputes as to which level 
of government (national, regional, or local) should be the initial owner. Needless to say, the 
potential and actual effects of the privatization process seem quite unpredictable given these 
many items of concern. The small East European countries that have embarked on 
privatizing large state enterprises earlier provide evidence of the different possible approaches 
and the various expected and unexpected (both positive and negative) outcomes of their 
respective programs. 
Although all the sessions were taped and a complete set of papers contributed by the 
participants was collected, this report is presented in a more concise manner. It is a 
summary of the key issues and a description of alternatives for the policy-makers. The 
structure of this report largely follows that of the seminars. The accounts of the various 
national experts and officials as well as the ensuing discussions during this seminar have been 
complemented with background material (these are listed in the references). The authors of 
this report and organizers of the seminar, all members of the ETI Project', wish to thank all 
the participants in the seminar for their contributions. Their names are listed in the 
Appendix. 
Vit Bih-ta, Jhos  G k s ,  Il'dar A. Karirnov, Merton J. Peck, Martin Rein, Christoph M. Schneider, and Tibor 
Vdko. 
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State enterprise behavior during economic transition in Russia 
The present behavior of the enterprises can be characterized with a changing mixture of old 
and new behavioral patterns. Many basic features of the old system of central planning 
disappeared, a new paradigm, however, has not yet evolved. Different scholars use different 
terms when they describe the system that characterizes the behavior of enterprises over the 
last two years. One of these terms is 'socially based markeV2. 
After universal administrative coordination has been abolished, many enterprises find 
themselves in a novel situation in which a very low share of their production is covered by 
orders, while financing current operations has become strict. Consequently, the extensive 
use of longestablished links amongst enterprises has increased significantly. Despite 
liberalized prices and greater freedoms for most enterprises than ever before, the solidarity 
among long established partners became more typical than new, market based initiatives and 
ties. Moral considerations and loyalty is often placed before the profit motive. The legacy 
of blurred property rights also contribute to this pattern of behavior. Following the 
liberalization of prices, many enterprises could exploit shortages or utilize their monopoly 
position to increase product prices; yet they have been reluctant to do so even when price 
increases of input prices could fully justified such a move. As surveys revealed, many of the 
managers consider it amoral to respond to opportunities by overpricing. There is also a 
widely used practice of price discrimination between old and new, state and private buyers 
(customers), usually for the benefit of the former in each case. These features justify the 
designation of the emerging market as socially-based market. 
Several seminar participants, like Randi Ryterman, interpret this phenomenon differently: 
they assert that cooperative behavior of enterprises which have long lasting relationships is 
not a symptom of moral behavior, but is serving the self interest of the firms themselves. 
Enterprises that are operating on imperfect markets are at the mercy of their long established 
suppliers and customers. It is only natural that they do not start adjustment by severing the 
vital ties with these partners. Essentially, the enterprises are preoccupied with their own 
survival, but at the same time also with the survival of their major partners. This is all the 
more important because recent research also indicates a high level of vertical dependence: 
most enterprises have only one or two major suppliers and one or two major customers. 
The term and the explanation was presented at the seminar by Viacheslav Shironin. See also his paper: State 
Enterprise Behavior under Economic Reform - aanges in Managerial Am'tudes and Objectives. 
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One of the reasons for the lack of competition in the already liberalized Russian markets is 
the perceived high level of concentration in Russian industry. While earlier studies3 have 
asserted that the concentration of Russian industry is extremely high (much higher than those 
of mature market economies), Randi Ryterman and Barry Ickes reported about their World 
Bank study presently in progress (led by themselves and Valery Makarov of CEMI, Moscow) 
which reveals startling results. Namely, the level of concentration in Russian industry is 
much lower than previously claimed, in fact lower than that of the USA, and military 
industry is showing even lower concentration in Russia than production for civilian 
purp~ses.~ In order to explain the behavior of enterprises in light of these new results, 
Ryterman argued that enterprises have been isolated from one another causing an absence of 
essential information regarding their real choices and the real market structure in the national 
and even local context. The technical possibility to select alternative suppliers/customers 
actually existed, but the lack of information, incentives, and central licenses prevented 
enterprises from considering these alternatives. Thus, the cause of imperfect competition is 
not the previously perceived high actual level of concentration, but rather the belief of the 
enterprise managers that they face large concentration by way of rigid supply structure and 
market segmentation. Nevertheless, other participants were more ready to accept earlier 
statistics on the concentration in Russian industry, partly on the base of their experience 
concerning strong technological interdependence of firms. 
As opposed to arguing that the rational behind current Russian firm behavior is the protection 
of moral values, some seminar participants felt that a more adequate description of the 
situation is enterprises operating in flux and oriented to survival. The highly uncertain 
environment and the lack of consistent regulations drive the behavior of these enterprises. 
As a consequence, f m s  have a very short time perspective. The tools for survival involve, 
among others, heavy reliance on government soft credits and the provision of informal 
commercial credits to customers. 
The tasks of policy-makers to create an environment in which enterprises revert from the 
survival mode to the market mode are multifarious, including efforts to reduce the enormous 
transaction costs enterprises are forced to bear when seeking new suppliers and customers 
in the new environment. The 'policy actions' of the government should include the two 
following crucial points: provision of information for alternative trading partners about the 
real structure of the market and regional and local authorities should cease restricting trade 
and should open their markets to the rest of the economy. Good and equal opportunities 
should be provided to new and distant agents to enter local markets. The transportation 
See l?u Economy of the USSR: Summary and Recommendations, a study undertaken in response to a request 
by the Houston Summit (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, 1990), and Peck, et al (eds.): What is to be done? (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1991). 
One reason for the differences of earlier and recent studies may be that earlier investigations took into 
account deliveries to the Gossnab only, i.e. those covered by the centralized system of material allocation. The 
coverage of military related production activities, as well as the level of disaggregation are also important factors 
in choosing from competing measures of industry concentration of Russia. 
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system, including train and road transport, should be developed, and adequate storage 
capacities should be established. The payments and settlements system should be improved 
by making it faster and more reliable. The enforcement of contract law would also enhance 
adjustments corresponding to the market system. In the framework of perfect competition, 
these kinds of advice would be unconventional, however in the Russian situation they are 
appropriate. 
Both scientific analysis and policy making would benefit from a proper classification of 
enterprises according to the differences in their behavioral pattern. Most seminar participants 
asserted that new private enterprises follow more market-like behavior than state owned 
firms, especially in decisions on current operations. In contrast to this, behavior of 
privatized state companies has not changed significantly from the time under state control. 
Due in part to the uncertain environment, criminal behavior is widespread in the private 
sector and the effects of increasing criminal activities are reducing budget revenues and 
jeopardizing macroeconomic performance. 
In Russia, private firms seem to target government support to their commercial activities, 
simply stated as squeezing money from the government, to the same degree as traditional 
state owned enterprises. This is true for private banks as well: they appear convinced that 
they are not going to make money without the government. However, notwithstanding the 
more rapid adjustment in the private sector, the behavior of most state enterprises also 
underwent considerable changes during the last two years. These changes can be analyzed 
by different methods like surveys and deep interviews. 
New behavioral t r e d  
Regarding the perception of changes in the economic environment, the majority of enterprise 
managers find the position of their enterprise financially uncertain (70%), rather than 
financially stable (23-25 %), or potentially bankrupt (5-6%). The share of enterprises that feel 
financially stable is higher in heavy, material based industries (like energy generation, oil, 
chemicals, and building materials industry) as well as in small and medium size enterprises 
(under one thousand employees), while those that consider themselves potentially bankrupt 
mostly belong to industries producing more processed output (machinery and light industry) 
and are large enterprises (one to five thousand employees). 
As in other East European economies, price liberalization and stabilization measures 
substantially curbed earlier pervasive shortages. As for sources of current problems, only 
7% of managers in the test sample refer to the unsatisfactory supply of inputs and 13% to 
labor related problems, while 61% mentioned that the lack of money is the major factor 
inhibiting enterprise operation. 
The following paragraphs summarize the findings of the paper by Sergey Alexashenko and Elvira Nabiullina: 
Enterprises in Transition - New Models of Behavior, prepared for the ETI seminar. 
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All of the managers who have evaluated the financial state of their enterprises as potentially 
bankrupt believe that their main goal is the preservation of the working collective. From the 
wider sample, however, 30% of managers are ready to reduce the work force by firing 
employees. Paradoxically, due to the special incentive of the excess wage tax they are also 
interested in retaining unproductive, low paid staff members in order to pay higher wages 
for essential employees. 92% of the managers are not ready to economize on wages and 
60% are not ready to restrict or terminate financing social programs. 
Pricing and investment are also viewed differently depending on the managers' perspectives. 
With respect to pricing practices, 58% of the enterprises use cost-plus pricing as their sole 
method, while 28% establish prices according to the demand for their products. Investments 
became more decentralized than before, but are less and less efficient because enterprises 
have no financial means to complete and fully employ them. 
A considerable part of the enterprises have become more active in restructuring their 
organization. Examples include: granting financial, managerial, and market independence to 
sub-units; separating and privatizing their highly profitable units, while liquidating the non- 
profitable ones; and reducing the size of traditional departments (like planning, labor, wages 
and training departments) and expand others (like sales, marketing and advertising). The 
choice of the enterprises to opt for market- or non-market behavior is customarily influenced 
by objective conditions like ownership, extent of monopoly, industrial affiliation, foreign 
trade dependence, inter-republican cooperation, burden of non-productive expenses, and the 
existing level of foreign competition. Yet, even more crucial factors influencing the 
behavioral style are personality of enterprise managers, and the signals that economic policy 
sends to enterprises. 
Alas, these signals were not at all unambiguous in the last two years and gave rise to a 
general atmosphere of uncertainty. Enterprise managers complain about inconsistent 
government policies and the introduction of regulations that have been unclear, unstable, and 
lacking enforcement. According to views of the management, government has done very little 
to prevent economic misconduct and breach of rules and contracts. 
Enterprise relations 
Changes over the last few years considerably reshaped the vertical and horizontal links of the 
enterprises with the authorities or control agencies and their partners6. 
As far as the committees (departments) that became successors of the ministries are 
concerned, most enterprises no longer regard them as proper authorities per se. Individual 
enterprises are no longer accountable to these large administrative organizations, though a 
certain degree of dependence prevail. Obtaining soft credits continues to be one such area 
The following paragraphs are summarizing the paper Tatiana Dolgopiatova prepared for the ETI seminar 
(title: Enterprises' Reldonr), and the discussions that followed the presentation of the paper. 
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in which support of a given committee or department is req~ired;~ another is the active 
participation in or even control of the ownership transformation of the enterprise, where these 
committees are quite openly and aggressively pressing for the adoption of their own ideas and 
schemes. 
Seminar participants expressed diverging opinions about the role local authorities currently 
play in the operation of enterprises. On the one hand, local authorities are not of much 
concern for enterprises since good relations are not difficult to maintain if so desired. In fact, 
local enterprise managers are part of the local establishment. On the other hand, after central 
control declined to a minimal level, control of local authorities took its place and became 
increasingly strict. The whole complexity of constitutional discussions reflects the endeavor 
of local authorities to take the power from the central government and conduct their own 
market interventions. If managers do not speak about frictions with local authorities, the real 
query is what makes managers accept the harsh interventions of local authorities? The 
imposition of diverging or additional local regulations where central controls already exist, 
the frequent neglect and arbitrary suspension of central government guidelines by local 
authorities, and the imposition of regional and local trade controls multiply the 
inconsistencies that the general framework of economic activity already exhibits. Further 
fields where local authorities seem to intervene is employment, production plans, and pricing 
policies. Local authorities try to convince slumping enterprises to hold and even take 
redundant labor in order to keep local unemployment low. These authorities also issue 
"official forecasts" that virtually work as plan targets, and pressurize enterprises to keep 
down prices of some consumer goods for "social" purposes. 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, branch ministries were abolished. Many of them, however, 
were already reorganized as corporations, joint stock companies, and associations embracing 
producers that used to be subordinated to them under the former regime. The relations of 
enterprises to these vertical hierarchical associations is now improving. Some may interpret 
the reluctance of enterprises to terminate membership in such associations, in spite of new 
freedoms to do so, as an indication of the better relations. Given the benefit these 
associations can provide, many smaller companies join even two, three, or more such 
associations. The latter offer the former the opportunity for greater economic and political 
power, particularly in lobbying more efficiently for soft credits and subsidies and building 
economic links with enterprises in other countries of the former Soviet Union. Horizontal 
associations also provide benefits for their members; however, disputes over reallocation of 
assets are not rare. 
The experiences of production enterprises with banks gave rise to substantial distrust on the 
part of the former. During periods of rapid inflation, enterprises are convinced of 
opportunistic misuse of their transfers and deposits by the banks. Most enterprises, however, 
have traditional connections to some banks, and these links constitute the basis of preferential 
According to the wording of one seminar participant, "Now the state is no more allocating material 
resources, but is doing the same with financial resources and the system of bargaining with the enterprises is the 
same as earlier". 
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credits granted to them. A characteristic indicator of the spread of preferential credits is the 
variation of annual interest rates on credits. This was 10-20 percentage points in 1992, but 
climbed to 100 points by 1993 (the lowest interest rates being 10-20%, while the highest 120- 
140%). The most advantageous terms are usually granted to enterprises who are co-founders 
of the given bank. While the participation of production enterprises in the ownership of 
banks is frequent, the opposite, namely the ownership of enterprise shares by banks, is rare. 
According to current practices, credits are "softened" not only by friendly banks but also 
by the state, which assumes responsibility for repaying part of the credit. 
Seminar participants also discussed the question why were managerial attitudes so different 
in Russia and Ukraine on the one hand, and in other countries of Eastern Europe like Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, on the other. One of the main reasons was that 
macroeconomic stabilization in the latter countries was more effective. This established a 
less uncertain environment and harder budget constraint for enterprises. Many analysts think 
the adjustment of enterprises in Russia was tardy not because there was no capacity for 
adjustment, but because the pressure on the enterprises was not strong enough. They could 
blackmail the government to obtain soft credit, thereby achieving an exceptionally extreme 
softness of the budget constraint. 
Another characteristic feature of transformation in other East European countries was a 
unmistakable turn away from the previous political system, implying replacement of the 
former communist-technocratic elite both on the level of the government and management. 
This has not happened to anywhere near such a degree in Russia. In Eastern Europe, earlier 
organizational decentralizations also contributed to the break-up of old monopolistic 
structures as did the uncompromising opening of the domestic markets to the world market. 
As opposed to this, the monopoly position of old specialized foreign trade organizations has 
been effectively maintained in Russia. 
Financial Reform: Policv Options 
The lack of financial development in Russia is one of the most problematic issues in 
transition. As it was widely recognized, imposition of the hard budget constraint on 
enterprises has not been successful in Russia so far. In market economies, multiple financial 
institutions channel enterprises' borrowing from other sectors of the national economy. Such 
a mechanism does not exist in Russia: enterprises, experiencing severe shortages of working 
capital, either have to plead for government subsidies, or finance themselves by stockpiling 
payments arrears. Once emerged, arrears become a very popular source of enterprise finance 
simply because nobody can be properly punished for overdue payments in a situation when 
everyone owes everyone. General confidence in the impunity makes arrears nearly 
unavoidable and this situation seriously undermines government attempts to carry out 
financial stabilization and accomplish other essential parts of the reform. 
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Although improving the flexibility of the economy to some extent, enterprise arrears generate 
additional costs of transition for two reasons: 1) they allocate available capital in an 
extremely inefficient way, and impose an additional "inflation tax" on potentially viable 
enterprises; and 2) they distort information on the financial status of enterprises. In this 
sense, the arrears in a transition economy fundamentally differ from widespread trade credits 
that enterprises lend to each other in developed market economies. The difference is that in 
a market economy lenders usually have an idea of how to get the money back since strong 
competition makes creditors and debtors inclined to closely adher to terms of repayment 
agreements, and there is a reliable legal enforcement of contracts as a last resort. In a 
transitional economy, performance of enterprise managers can no longer be judged on the 
basis of balance sheets, since there are too many exogenous factors affecting the flow of 
revenues, and too much uncertainty in available information. Moreover, even if the accounts 
are potentially receivable, there is no reliable enforcement of a desirable transfer. 
Since financial status becomes unimportant, enterprises develop peculiar attitudes towards 
their suppliers and customers. Rather than cost-minimizing, survival becomes the main 
priority for enterprise managers. The best way to guarantee survival is to invest in suppliers 
and customers -- rather than to invest in machinery and technology, since there is no way to 
calculate the true profit generating potential of machinery and technology. In order to make 
such an "investment in their partners", enterprises simply order inputs from suppliers in 
quantities exceeding their actual ability to pay (with the reasonable hope that the government 
will cover the difference), and let customers borrow-in-kind by delaying payments and hence 
keeping those customers from facing difficulties. As an important by-product, such a strategy 
enables enterprise managers to borrow in return from suppliers and customers when their 
own enterprise gets into trouble. 
A more efficient functioning of the enterprise sector in Russia would require the re- 
orientation of enterprise directors from ensuring the survival towards improving the financial 
performance. This reorientation is particularly difficult because of the low probability that 
the government would take a tough stance towards highly indebted enterprises: the 
government simply cannot afford the entire industry to go bankrupt. There has been a policy 
mix of contradictory measures that the government pursued: in order to solve arrears the 
government had to ease its credit policy, which however, substantially destroyed the 
efficiency of the efforts to impose hard budget constraints to avoid arrears in the future. 
It does not take many really insolvent enterprises to generate widespread arrears in the entire 
economy, especially in the payment system that is very lax in making payments between 
enterprises. In such a system, the ability of one enterprise to pay its arrears depends not on 
its own financial ability, but rather on the general standing of the entire chain of customers 
and suppliers. It is very difficult to distinguish between enterprises that are potentially solvent 
but just struck with bad debts, from those enterprises that have to be closed in transition 
since they cannot be efficient in a new market environment. Anti-inflationary measures are 
still very risky in such an environment. Drastic across-the-board tightening of credits can 
cause detrimental financial strain for otherwise potentially solvent enterprises. Subsidies are 
probably unavoidable in transition until an appropriate financial system is built. 
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However, efforts should be made to alter enterprise behavior. A few policy options can be 
recommended in such a situation: 
1. The government should distinguish between subsidies ex ante and subsidies ex 
post. Subsidies should not be based on individual enterprise performance but 
rather on a general structural approach. Doing this, the government creates 
clear incentives for enterprises to minimize costs, while simple "making-up" 
the actual losses never brings about such incentives. 
2. Since financial markets do not automatically identify insolvent enterprises, all 
efforts should be made to separate a few hundred candidates for bankruptcy 
from the rest of the industry, and either close them or restructure them by 
administrative measures. The important consideration is to guarantee that 
restructuring always involves a replacement of an enterprise manager who led 
the enterprise into bankruptcy: without such a provision, restructuring will 
have no effect on the behavior of enterprises at large. 
3. The government should encourage decentralization of payment settlements and 
take measures on the general reduction of average payment time. This will 
strip potentially insolvent enterprises of the perfectly "objective" justification 
for their poor financial standing. This will also enable the government to focus 
on the institutional part of the problem of arrears rather than on its pure 
technical part in the future. 
An Effective System of Taxes: Relevance for Enterprise Behavior8 
In general, the businessman in a Western 'market economy' wants the government to 
minimize its interference with the businessmen's day-to-day life, reduce the rate of corporate 
tax and the costs of hiring labor, and give more generous allowances and credits against tax 
liability. Seventy years of communist rule has made the implicit contract between the 
taxpayer and the government in Russia different from that in Western society and a new 
social contract has yet to be fully articulated and accepted. Since the responsible authorities 
had first call on bank accounts by direct debit, enterprises had little direct contact with the 
tax administration and were consequently unfamiliar with standard concepts of taxation. 
As the transition to a market economy proceeds, allowing competitive commercial banlung 
to emerge and relinquishing the powers of the former central authority due to liberalization, 
deregulation, and privatization, the concepts of tax filing, tax returns, assessment, tax audit, 
standardized transparent tax rates, and hard budget constraints have all taken on a new 
significance. Clearly, the issues of tax morality have become of paramount importance, 
especially considering the continued belief (derived from the past society) that one measure 
A summary of the paper and presentation by Alan Tait and the ensuing discussions. The title of the paper 
is Enterprise Behavior under the Conditions of Economic Growth in the Russian Federan'on: Taxation. 
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of entrepreneurial success in a planned economy was the ability to get around or manipulate 
government regulations or government planning requirements. Indeed, the transition has 
greatly changed the latitude of enterprise managers to delay returns and payments and to 
challenge assessments. The lack of enforceable penalties and the persistence of gentlemanly 
bilateral deals severely undermine tax morality and cheat the authorities out of revenues. 
In addition, the continued existence of daunting uncertainties due to tax changes not only 
intimidates and discourages entrepreneurship but simultaneously increases the motivation to 
mount efforts to avoid taxation. Many Russian managers have the same concerns as their 
Western counterparts but it is likely such concerns will be magnified and are probably more 
serious in impeding adjustment. A real dilemma has materialized on the reform road to a 
market economy in the Russian Federation. On the one hand, Russian managers beseech 
government to reduce tax rates, increase tax credits and subsidies, and implement 
protectionist measures to preserve them from the threats of international competition, while 
on the other hand they call for the state to avoid intervention in the business world as much 
as possible. The defensive mechanism utilized by entrepreneurs to deal with the uncertainties 
are likely to distort taxation. The enterprise profits tax, the excess wages tax, and the value- 
added tax are examples of tax regulation burdened by all the afore-mentioned problems. 
Each tax and tax policy more generally should be compatible with the goals of the overall 
reform. Many lessons can be drawn from the discussion of the difficulties associated with 
taxation in the transition in a way that should not negatively influence enterprise behavior, 
particularly regarding the three examples identified above. The following eight lessons will 
help in developing a taxation scheme that secures government revenue, encourages tax 
morality, and does not unnecessarily burden enterprises with unreasonable costs during the 
otherwise already difficult time of transition. 
First, a crucial prerequisite is to draft clear and unambiguous legislation with well established 
priorities and objectives. The appropriate taxes must be selected to achieve satisfactory 
redistributional aims and other social ends while insuring tax revenues and compliance and 
reducing tax administration complexity. Second, the new tax system should greatly reduce, 
if not in many circumstances eliminate, bureaucratic intervention. Third, if the government 
should wish to continue granting subsidies to target groups of enterprises or industries, these 
should be completely divorced from the tax system. The fewer special rules and exceptions, 
the clearer the tax scheme remains and the less the chance for evasion. Fourth, do not create 
opportunities for connivance to avoid tax liability, for instance, connivance between managers 
and workers to evade the excess wages tax. Fifth, refrain from introducing taxes that will 
result in confusing signals at the enterprise level. Sixth, all parties, whether from the private 
or public sectors, should be treated identically under the tax code with no special advantages 
for either. Seventh, tax liability and tax rates should be characterized by geographic 
uniformity. It is probably better to use targeted transfers if a serious need for assistance or 
relief in a particular region or municipality arises, than differentiated tax rates. Finally, 
market-oriented business, whether public or private, sets forth the existence of properly 
presented profit and loss accounts, as well as balance sheets. Consequently, accounting 
concepts and abilities are of great importance both in tax administration and in enterprises 
now and in Russia's market economic future. 
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Following these eight fundamental lessons should result in a tax system that will positively 
orient enterprise behavior in a manner to promote economic growth during the transition in 
the Russian Federation and thereafter. Nevertheless, its affects will achieve little alone. The 
new taxation scheme must be accompanied by the other crucial aspects of reform such as 
legal reform, deregulation, free prices, privatization, and clear ownership rights. 
Enterprises and Forei~n Trade: The Impact of the Reforms 
Foreign trade reform, although one of the most advanced parts of Russian economic reforms 
at large, has probably the least significant impact on enterprise behavior in comparison to the 
other reforms. It would be wrong to say that the opening of the economy, introduction of 
tariff regulation, and establishment of currency markets did not affect enterprise behavior at 
all, but their impact was fairly different from what economists would usually expect from 
such radical changes in conditions of trade. 
In advanced market economies and in most developing countries, industries are very sensitive 
to changes in conditions of trade: in response to changes in tariff regulation, exchange rate 
regimes, and administrative controls of trade, enterprises either diminish or broaden the 
international division of labor, attract foreign investments or move production overseas, slash 
production costs, fire redundant labor force, adjust output, and even change the entire profile 
of production. These responses, however, were either not happening in Russia during the 
first one and a half years of reform, or were occurring at a much lesser scale than 
conventional wisdom could have suggested. At the same time, the most visible and drastic 
changes in enterprise behavior in response to the foreign trade liberalization -- except for 
obvious cutbacks in imports and growth of some categories of exports -- developed along two 
major directions until now: "informal" trade activities and capital flight. 
Despite radical opening of the economy, rapid development of currency markets, remarkably 
inexpensive labor, and the unfolding lack of decent environmental protection, the changes 
in enterprise behavior were rather slow. There was radical adjustment in trade volumes, but 
it should rather be called "adjustment without positive restructuring in production". 
Russian enterprises have been exporting greater quantities of goods (i.e., non-ferrous metals), 
since the borders had been opened and administrative restrictions had been lifted by Gaidar's 
government in 1992. But higher exports did not generate higher investments and rather 
resulted in excessive exploitation of already nearly exhausted production capacities. 
Moreover, the loosening of export control stimulated under-invoicing or simply smuggling 
of exports, capital flight, tax evasion, corruption, and violation of trade regulations of 
advanced industrial countries. 
Mostly due to the collapse of CMEA trade, Russian enterprises drastically reduced exports 
of machinery. But this has not resulted in desirable re-distributions of resources within the 
manufacturing sector towards production demanded on the world market: whole branches of 
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manufacturing exports simply vanished (often together with domestic production: a good 
example is the Russian computer industry), and respective production lines were either shut 
down or conserved. No workers were laid off or at least re-trained, no new investments 
made, and no new technologies developed. Thus far, opening of the national economy did 
not result in positive achievements in overall productivity or better utilization of the country's 
comparative advantages, nor did it make domestic industries more efficient and competitive. 
Many Russian enterprises exporting raw materials got relatively rich. But additional wealth 
(which came to a great extent through illicit channels) went to purchases of fancy cars and 
TV sets for workers and managers, rather than for new technologies and machinery, spare 
parts or packaging materials. Better financial standing of enterprises did not encourage 
enterprise managers to increase investments and improve technologies or products, and did 
not induce enterprises to further penetrate foreign markets. 
Foreign exchange is easily available in internal currency markets. Nonetheless, the bulk of 
foreign currency still covers purchases of consumer goods rather than those of machinery and 
technologies to support more efficient domestic production. The relatively inexpensive and 
well-educated Russian labor force is still waiting for better use by 'reluctant-to-change' 
enterprise managers. 
At the macroeconomic level, the country's general trade orientation is slowly drifting towards 
the classical pattern of a developing country in its early stage of industrialization: the country 
exports raw-materials in exchange for consumer goods and services. If this will be the major 
long-term result of opening the country, such an opening was not worth undertaking. 
However, it would be wrong to blame the trade reform for these undesirable outcomes: trade 
reform just uncovered diseases caused by years of distorting administrative control. 
There is a number of reasons why Russian industries do not react "appropriately" to trade 
liberalization. One group of reasons is purely "technical". "Technical" reasons either make 
civilized restructuring too complicated and costly, or, alternatively, make unlawful practices 
impunitive and very profitable. Among these reasons are, on the one hand, the generally 
high level of instability, underdeveloped financial markets, high transaction costs, poor 
telecommunications, corruption of authorities, strong "socialist" traditions of labor force, 
and, on the other hand, loose capital controls, poor fiscal discipline, transparent borders, 
corruption of authorities, and generally low business moral. The task of the government is 
nothing but to undertake efforts to improve the situation surrounding the first sub-group of 
reasons, while fighting the second sub-group's rudiments of administrative controls with all 
possible means. 
However, such work alone would be unsuccessful unless more fundamental changes, going 
far beyond the trade reform, are guaranteed. Among these changes, the most important 
ones are fast privatization and establishment of civilized property rights. This will give 
Russian enterprises real owners who will be more capable of thinking about costs, 
productivity, investments, technologies, than current old-fashioned managers. 
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Another necessary change would be the enforcement of the bankruptcy law. This will allow 
for more efficient use of resources, higher capital mobility, and better utilization of the 
country's comparative advantages in the international division of labor. This should also be 
accompanied by the promotion of labor mobility, development of financial markets, and 
fiscal incentives for small businesses. 
Last but not least, conditions for both domestic and foreign investors should be improved. 
This would generate the necessary resources for a trade-driven adjustment of the national 
economy. 
Social Welfare and the Enterprise9 
lh present system of enterprise social protection 
The components of enterprise social protection fall into two main categories: those that are 
legally mandated and those pursued at the discretion and initiative of the firm and sometimes 
as an outcome of collective bargaining agreements. The mandated system is financed from 
payroll taxes and is earmarked to a Social Security Fund, but administered by the enterprise. 
One quarter of the payroll contribution was allocated to the center and the remainder was 
absorbed by the enterprise. This implies that the lion's share of the 5.4% of total payroll 
used to finance social services is retained at the enterprise level. The funds combined with 
general government subsidies helped create a public network of week-end retreats, sanatoria, 
health resorts, vacation facilities, etc. In addition the funds covered sick pay, maternity, child 
care leave as well as pension and other social benefits. Many observers believe that the 
Russian system of social protection placed the firm in a more strategic role in the social care 
system than other former Communist countries. The author of the background paper accepted 
this view by strongly asserting that "the entire system of social benefits in the Soviet Union 
was geared to enterprises. " 
Historically enterprises could not in principle reallocate social functions to other purposes. 
However, the enterprises could reallocate among the social functions for example, in the 
balance between sick pay, sports and other social functions. But the much more interesting 
source of flexibility was the enterprises' ability creatively to draw resources from the Social 
Fund and effectively to cross-subsidize the wage fund. It is important for any discussion of 
reform to recognize that these sources of flexibility helped make the system work in practice. 
However, the system is now in transition as more and more benefits are distributed 
independent of the former employer and out of the centralized component of the Social 
Security Fund. Old company-based benefits are increasingly ceded by enterprises back to off- 
budget social security funds, and the state has to take on the most relevant social benefits. 
This summary is based on Alexander Telyukov's paper (Social Weyare and the Enterprise), the comments 
of the discussant and the audience. 
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The listing of non-mandated social benefits sheds light on how widespread their use have 
become. The background paper by Telyukov lists 12 different cash benefits including items 
such as additional old-age pensions, severance pay on retirement, educational scholarships, 
cash grants to offset increased cost of firm based meals, etc. In addition, there are at least 
8 different benefits in-kind including subsidized kindergartens, preschool facilities, 
transportation subsidies, etc. 
One of the important questions in judging the significance of an enterprise as a source of 
social protection is to assess the level of non mandated social spending. According to 
estimations in the late 1980s, about 20% of the whole network of social service facilities was 
owned and financed by enterprises. Another characteristic estimate for the value of the 
property used by enterprises in providing social services such as polyclinics, nursery schools, 
etc., suggests that in the early 1990's social benefits accounted for 14% of the entire 
depreciated stock of futed assets in enterprises of the mining and manufacturing sector. 
In the past, the Social Security Fund was managed by the labor unions assuring relative 
harmony between the federal level, the unions, and the grassroots organizations in the 
enterprises. The mandated system provides for uniformity of coverage and of benefits and 
assures an equal financial burden on all enterprises. By contrast the non-mandated system, 
because it involved firm discretion, was unevenly distributed by industry and presumably by 
occupation as well. In this sense, social benefits (even in the old system) was a means of 
widening the narrow earnings range of Soviet workers. This interpretation is different than 
the conventionally accepted hypotheses that in the socialist system, social protection by 
enterprise was more or less inclusive and rather egalitarian. In a transitional system or a 
market system, the social provisions of firms are much less inclusive, and aimed at 
increasing the remuneration difference in favor of higher and scarcer categories of 
employees. Thus, in the transition, even if the total level of social spending remains stable, 
enterprise social protection will create more income inequality and increase the need for more 
public social protection to act as an offset. Understanding the distributional consequences of 
social protection is therefore clearly important. 
In the absence of satisfactory statistical information it is rather the inferences based on the 
understanding of the institutional structure and the logic, than hard evidence, that helps 
drawing up the possible characteristics of current enterprise behavior with respect to social 
welfare. One could assume that there is a high degree of continuity in the provision of 
enterprise social protection despite the financial constraints and organizational chaos. 
The arguments in support of this hypothesis are the following. First is the paternalistic 
commitment -- the sense of obligation and responsibility managers felt to social objectives. 
Second, since managerial authority is most likely to be challenged by work collectives, 
managers have a clear interest not to antagonize this constituency by cutting back on benefits. 
Third, there is the pragmatism of limited alternatives. Three-quarters of the urban population 
lives in small localities with a single large state enterprise. The sole employer is the only 
institutional structure for providing social services, with municipal services playing only a 
modest role. Closing the enterprise cripples the social structure of the whole community 
making the cost of shedding social protection socially very high by increasing the risk of 
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politically destabilizing the society. Fourth, both non-wage fringes and the wide spread 
practice of retaining unneeded workers can be used as a means of tax and regulation 
avoidance. For example, when the government introduced the excess wages tax, the 
enterprise responded by switching the surplus of the wage fund over the cap to non-wage 
benefits. This move increased employer provided social benefits for rent, utilities, life and 
property insurance, etc. 
In the course of the discussion of the background paper it was pointed out that if the social 
functions of the enterprise are divested, local government, if it assumed these functions, 
might tax the enterprise to cover the costs under a different auspices. Whatever firm specific 
benefits accrued when the provision of social protection was under firm auspices are thereby 
lost. It was also observed that social protection, by its nature, involves high fixed costs. This 
has the obvious disadvantage of making cost reduction difficult for the firm. But it also has 
a social advantage, since it creates an environment where the incentive to shed workers is 
weak, since the cost of adding an additional or loosing a worker is relatively low. 
Finally, some participants took the position that the state would in practice not do anything. 
Still others took the stronger view that the state should do nothing and moreover in the 
present chaos the state can do nothing. This theory of the state in transition implied that the 
enterprise was the only viable arrangement for social protection. It was also argued that in 
hyper-inflation workers might in fact prefer benefits to wages. 
The drawbacks of enterprise sponsored social protection 
The summary of enterprise tactics leading to the maintenance of social protection lead many 
in the audience to respond with words of caution about the desirability of pursuing this 
course of action. For example, drawing on western experience it was pointed out that 
mandating reduces labor mobility and decreases the flexibility of labor markets to adjust to 
changes in product demand and new technologies. Moreover, enterprises vary in their 
capacity to maintain the social commitments they make. The USA auto industry is based on 
a 'pay as you go' scheme. This implies that current workers must pay for those who retire. 
As the industry is retrenched the pool of current workers available to undertake this task is 
sharply reduced, thus making the entire system of financing unfeasible from an economic 
perspective. Historically this happened in the American railroad industry, a sharp reduction 
in the size of the labor force left the industry unable to pay for the system of generous 
pension benefits it had undertaken to provide. As a result there is a historic anomaly. The 
Federal government runs the social security system for the railroads, because at that time 
there was no other politically acceptable option other than the state or local government to 
take over these social functions. The lesson is clear. If Russian industries maintain their 
social protection the risk of economic collapse cannot be far behind. 
Some participants of the discussions asserted that wages are the important component that 
provide the incentive for high productivity. Non-wage labor costs tend to be interpreted by 
workers in non-incentive terms as an entitlement or obligation. If this argument is correct 
then low wages are the main cause of low productivity. 
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The transition 
How can one get an enterprise out of the social functions it historically performed, if 
divestiture or shedding cannot be done instantaneously by fiat? Clearly some period of 
transition is needed. Two views emerged. The author of the background paper believes that 
divided government is a danger and a threat to reform. Government must be integrated and 
the autonomy of regulatory ministries seeking a social function must be curbed. Others 
assumed that shedding social functions of enterprises is naive, in the absence of a serious and 
sustainable reform of the system of taxation, medical care and housing. 
Enter~rise Behavior: Polish and Czech Ex~erience 
The behavior of enterprises in Poland1' during the transition period has been influenced by 
two parallel processes. The first is stabilization and marketization of the economy and the 
second is privatization. Each process has a particular impact on the decision-making of firms, 
but are sometimes very difficult to discern from one another. It is useful to realize that 
before real privatization can occur (i.e. the transfer of shares of formerly state owned 
enterprises into the hands of private owners), the pre- or quasi-privatization stage precedes. 
This is a stage when state enterprises are being prepared (through commercialization, 
corporatization, separation of some units, and the elaboration of privatization projects) for 
the transfer of property rights. The behavior of firms is different in these two stages. 
Behavioral patterns of enterprises are strongly influenced by the attitudes of insiders to 
privatization. Two groups of agents inside the enterprises are interested in privatization. 
These are managers, who hope to have more freedom in controlling the enterprise, and 
workers' councils, that also hope to benefit. Trade unions usually take a stance against 
privatization. 
On the basis of surveys wried out on a sample of enterprises going through privatization, 
some interesting developments can be identified. A striking fact of the Polish transition is the 
decrease in net profit margins in recent years. While it amounted, on average, to 29% in 
1990, it declined to about 7% by the end of 1992. There are various reasons behind this 
decrease. The highest profit margins were achieved in commercialized firms because only 
the best f m s  (about 200) were chosen for commercialization at the beginning of 
privatization. The lowest profit margins were displayed by the leased firms (leased by 
workers for about 10 years) and firms selected for liquidation. 
It is also noteworthy that privatized firms show lower economic efficiency than state-owned 
firms. Privatized and private firms are exposed to a certain standard way of auditing and 
have to show a more transparent accounting than state owned firms. Since they face up to 
lo This section is based on oral presentation by Wladyslaw Jermakowicz and the following discussion. 
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40% corporate income tax, they attempt to lower the net profit margin by, expanding 
production costs or paying out special benefits to employees. This may be one explanation 
for the fact that firms with more publicly owned shares report higher profits, and those with 
more shares in private hands show lower profits." If this tendency continues, it will have a 
fatal impact on public finance because the more the economy is privatized the fewer revenues 
will be collected by the budget. 
Undeniably, the export of Polish industries increased substantially during the transition 
period. But as analysts determined, exporters mostly increase the quantity of exports and do 
not alter the quality: they neither change the structure of exports nor do they penetrate into 
new markets. The only exceptions here are firms taken over by foreign investors. 
As far as the level of employment is concerned, the aggregate number of employees 
decreased, but quite unequally. While employment dropped most in privatized f m s ,  it 
remained nearly constant or declined negligibly in enterprises that went through the process 
of commercialization only. A similar pattern emerges in the case of wages. These rise more 
in privatized firms (especially in leased firms -- usually by employees) and less in non- 
privatized enterprises. In state-owned firms the difference between the highest and lowest 
salary was 6: 1, in private firms it increased to 15: 1. In the overwhelming majority of cases, 
privatization has not caused changes in composition of the management personnel of the 
firms: essentially the same people remained in the executive boards after privatization 
occurred. 
A characteristic difference arises among firms with respect to investments. While both private 
and leased f m s  carry out some new investments, this is not the case with commercialized 
f m s .  Moreover, the latter have less access to new bank credits because of their worse 
credibility. 
Organizational changes also show different intensity in the two groups of firms. These 
changes are quite substantial in privatized firms but rather minimal in commercialized firms. 
Privatized firms sell those parts of the enterprise that are not profitable or are not connected 
with the main activity of the enterprise. Marketing and sales departments are expanded within 
the firms, while the extent of purchasing departments is reduced. Organizational structures 
are becoming flatter and less hierarchical. 
A passive wait-and-see approach is typical for commercialized firms: they make less changes, 
increase wages by a smaller extent, and reduce employment slowly. In the case of leased 
firms, the employees (also quasi-owners) are much more interested in increasing wages and 
in preventing lay-offs. They are much less interested in either profits or dividends. 
Two general conclusions can be drawn from the Polish experience: 1) While the relations 
between the government and the enterprises were more centralized in the old system, the 
l1 A crucial point is, whether the private firms really are inefficient or whether they only dimlay low 
efficiency for whatever reasons. Hungarian experience seems to indicate that the latter alternative is often the case. 
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relations inside the enterprise were relatively relaxed. After privatization government- 
enterprise relations become relaxed, while the hierarchical relations within the enterprise 
become substantially more autocratic; and 2) the more privatized the firms are and the 
smaller the number of the owners of the company (i.e. more concentrated ownership), the 
more active strategy is developed in production, investment, organizational changes, etc. 
Any insight into the current transformation of the economic system in the Czech Rep~blic'~ 
should take into account the extremely strong position of the state sector in the economy at 
the outset of the reform. A highly centralized system aimed at "industrialization and 
concentration" had been systematically developed for four decades without any major detours 
or reconsideration. It ended up with 96.7% of total GDP being produced in state owned 
companies in the middle of 1980s. Strong monopolies, a high share of the employees in 
large f m s ,  and informal ways of allocating the resources (i.e. of barter character) were 
typical phenomena. As the institutional complement to this sui generis establishment, a 
hidden structure of different coalitions (not necessarily driven by profit motives) existed. 
Owing to their long-lasting existence, numerous coalitions between ministries and companies 
survived and form the landscape of today's everyday activity despite the abolishment of many 
government agencies. 
In the former CSFR, the original conception was to privatize the enterprises as quickly as 
possible and exclude the government from the ensuing restructuring as much as possible. 
Restructuring was carried out in two waves. In the first wave, which started in 1990, 
companies themselves reacted to the above mentioned over-concentration of industries. Many 
enterprise managers came to ministries and submitted proposals for splitting up the firms so 
that the original number of companies doubled or tripled in a short time. This "spontaneous 
de-monopolization" transformed into the second - more systematic - wave in 1992-93 that 
corresponded to the wave of privatization (most notably the voucher privatization). In the 
course of this phase, even outsiders were allowed to make proposals for further 
de-monopolization and splits. While in 1989 there were 430 large industrial trusts, the 
numbers grew to 16,852 incorporated companies with more than 5 employees, and 2,258 
incorporated companies with more than 25 employees in 1992. As an illustration for the pace 
of de-monopolization one may refer to the construction industry, where the average size of 
companies decreased from more than 3,000 to 250 employees. This process was also 
purposefully promoted by the abolishment of the barriers to entry and easing the start-ups 
of new companies. 
Small-scale privatization helped, among others, to select and separate those small 
"operational units" from the large companies which were maintained by the mother company 
for reasons not directly related to the businesss activity (for example, recreation facilities, 
hotels, etc.). Currently 4,000 out of 6,000 large firms are being privatized in the first and 
second waves of large-scale privatization. Also the participation of foreign capital was 
encouraged. The number of sizable joint ventures rose from 116 in 1990 to 5,490 in 1992. 
l2 This section draws from oral and written presentation by Michal MejsHk and the following discussion. 
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It seems that the noticeable increase of exports to western markets is to a large extent the 
result of the strategy of those producers who concentrated on liquid customers of established 
markets (despite low profit margins), and who, at the same time, took some risks by 
introducing new product lines. This seems to contrast with the behavior of Polish managers 
who are very active in marketing, but more risk averse in restructuring production. 
Generally, the trade reorientation of Czech companies toward western markets and especially 
the EC continues unexpectedly well. However, the pace of penetration into western markets 
is hindered by rising protectionism in the West. On the import side, trade liberalization 
undermined the monopolistic structure of the domestic market and accelerated several 
liquidations of some old-fashioned producers, especially in the electronics industry. 
Managers of many state-owned enterprises originally expected that privatization (and 
especially voucher privatization) will facilitate easy survival. In many cases, they are now 
surprised that the investment privatization funds, which hold a decisive share of their 
property, are trying to execute corporate governance and impose ownership rights fairly 
rapidly and forcefully. Shortly after investment privatization funds obtained shares in the 
enterprises, many managers were fired and replaced. Despite these examples for active 
behavior by some investment funds, their eventual and real impact on the performance of 
enterprises is still in doubt; pessimistic views that they will not act as active investors are 
widespread, but not yet confirmed. 
As in other economies in transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe, inter- 
enterprise indebtedness also became pervasive in the Czech Republic. Recently it reached CK 
200 billion (USD 7 billion). This phenomenon illustrates the specific way of enterprise 
adjustment to the existing conditions. On the one hand, it is definitely a consequence of 
restrictive macroeconomic policies, but, on the other, it is also a result of deliberate 
strategies and expectations of the managers derived from the pattern of privatization and 
ensuing personal benefits. Managers expect that decisions as to whose firms' bills will be 
paid are being made on the basis of anticipated debt/equity swaps which will transfer parts 
of the companies to major creditors or suppliers. 
In an effort to prevent a massive chain of bankruptcies several schemes were developed by 
the Czech government. They consisted of: 1) transferring the so-called "working capital 
loans" (inherited from the past) to a specially established "Consolidation Bank" and easing 
the conditions of these loans; 2) cleansing bank portfolios of bad debts of enterprises which 
were to enter voucher privatization (with the help of issuing a large amount of bonds by the 
Fund of National Property); and 3) tracing the chains of indebtedness and ensuing mutual 
debt clearance. The purpose of these measures was to identify and extinguish the sources of 
the "infection of illiquidity" without providing a continued subsidization to poorly 
performing enterprises. Surprisingly enough, the number of bankruptcies is very low until 
now. l3  
l3  The bankruptcy law was put into full effect in April 1993. 
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From the labor point of view, the restructuring of companies is not reflected in the respective 
growth of unemployment. Until recently, all laid-off people were quite smoothly absorbed 
by the newly created private sector which generated (or to which were transferred from the 
former state sector) roughly 1.5 million full-time jobs in the Czech Republic. Unemployment 
is currently about 2.6%, the lowest in Central and Eastern Europe. By the completion of the 
first wave of privatization, the rate of unemployment is expected to increase to about 5-8 %. 
This level is considered, however, as a necessary condition for the better functioning of the 
labor market. 
Last but not least, labor skills inside enterprises are being upgraded. For some time now, 
previously neglected activities like marketing, financial management, cost accounting, etc., 
are systematically developed. Also the managerial mentality and behavior of enterprises is 
changing from a production orientation to marketing orientation. 
Whether companies will follow traditional behavior (muddling through), or an innovative 
style (actively reacting to changing market conditions) depends on many factors. One of the 
most important factors is the personality of managers. It can be claimed that in many cases, 
the quality of managers, their dedication and responsibility are the major explanatory variable 
of enterprise performance. l4 
The transformation of a supply-driven (excess demand) to a demand driven (excess supply) 
market had a strong influence on enterprise behavior. According to business tendency surveys 
carried out in Hungary, the shift from a situation, where the shortage of input materials used 
to be the major impediment to production to a situation where the lack of demand for output 
is the predominant impediment is explicit in the last few years.15 Comparable surveys for 
Russia16 indicate that this trend is weaker in the case of Russian enterprises, most probably 
because pressing shortages in many areas still exist. Nevertheless, one puzzle arises here: 
while the emergence of excess supply contributed to generally a harder budget constraint, it 
did so without generating a sweeping wave of bankruptcies. 
Attention must be paid to the contemporary position of the former nomenclatura and 
communist party bureaucrats. While many representatives of this group were replaced in top 
positions of the government and parliament bodies after the political landslides in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, this was not carried out in Russia and other successor republics 
of the Soviet Union. As a reflection of the changes in the higher echelon of the hierarchy in 
Central Europe, the enterprise level nomenclatura was also replaced, or at least the old 
nomenclatura has either a low profile or completely changed its face. In Russia changes in 
this respect seem to be minimal. It is true that the more the economic environment deviates 
l4 The following aection reflects the summary remarks given by Jhos  GAcs at the ETI seminar. 
l5 The changing importance of  purchase versus sales departments is also evidence for the shift from a supply 
constrained to a demand constrained system. 
l6 See the background paper by Alexashenko and Nabiullina. 
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from a standard market one (disruptions of trade leading to barter; enterprise arrears calling 
for softer credits; etc.), the more relevant will be the informal connections built up under the 
former regime. It is undeniable that the former nomenclatura has, from this point of view, 
a more advantageous starting position than those who were not involved in party and 
bureaucratic structures. It can be even assumed that due to the acquired knowledge of the 
contemporary post-socialist situation, local managers are, for the time being, more qualified 
to solve everyday problems than western managers would be. Nevertheless, in order to 
generate a criteria for managers which would reveal how to carry out restructuring consistent 
with the market paradigm, external corporate governance should be imposed on them. 
enera1 Issues of Privatization; 
Statement by Vice-Premier Anatoly Chu bais17 
At the outset Mr. Chubais stated that, as an active participant, he could not be an objective 
observer of Russian privatization. However, his experience leads him to stress that 
privatization has both political and economic aspects: political limits on privatization were 
dominant in shaping the program, while economic factors were secondary. 
When privatization began in January 1992, there were only 38 private shops and restaurants 
in all of Russia. By June 1993, there were 63,000 private Russian enterprises. Most were 
small firms, but 4,500 large and medium-sized firms have been transformed from state 
enterprises into joint stock companies. There are now 20 million shareholders in Russia, 
most holding shares in the enterprises in which they work. By July of 1993, more than 
thirty-five percent of all employees in Russian industry were working for joint stock 
companies; according to estimations by the end of 1993, fifty percent of all Russian 
employees will work in the non-state sector. 
Stages in the Creation of the Privatization Process 
It is crucial to understand the political reasons underlying economic decisions in the 
privatization program. There were five stages in the evolution of the program. 
1. In 1990, a privatization law passed, but it had no method for implementation. 
Submitting a more effective program to the full Parliament in the fall of 1991 was 
likely to result in months of debate and long delay. The government wanted to move 
quickly, and submitted the "Direction of Privatization of State Enterprises" to the 
Presidium of the Parliament rather than to the full body. By the end of December 
1991, this document was approved and became the starting point of the privatization 
process. 
l7 This section is an edited version of  Mr. Chubais' remarks made at the seminar. Chubais has been the leader 
of  the Russian privatization program since its inception. 
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2. In January 1992, the Ministry of Privatization (or, as it is called, the Committee for 
the Management of State Property) was established at the Federal level and, more 
importantly, privatization offices were created at the local level. By mid-1992 there 
were departments of privatization in every district of Russia. 
Simultaneously in the first months of 1992, there were extensive discussions about 
privatization in the Parliament and in the press. In fact, all the major social groups 
were opposed to the government's concept of privatization: the worker's collectives 
because the program gave too much of the property to the managers; the managers 
because too much of the property would go to the workers; the business people 
because too much of the property would go to workers and managers; and the rest of 
society because they felt that they would gain little from privatization. 
Discussions overcame these objections so that by June 1992, the Parliament approved 
a reasonable plan. The plan reflected a balance among the main political forces and 
the dominant social groups. The Communists continued to disapprove, but they could 
muster no more than thirty-five percent of the votes in Parliament. 
3. There were now two months - from July to September 1992 - in which Parliament 
was not in session. This time was used to move quickly on privatization. On 14 
August, a presidential decree introduced privatization vouchers to be distributed to 
all Russians. This significant step converted privatization from a topic people read 
about in newspapers to one that became part of everyday life. The shift in public 
attitudes during the first half of 1992 was very important and made privatization 
irreversible. 
As the general public became more favorable, the Parliament became less so. Some 
members became concerned and began to plan how to stop the privatization process. 
In the fall of 1992, perhaps no more than ten percent of Parliament members would 
have voted for privatization. 
4. Between January and April 1993, Parliament began to recognize, however, that it was 
impossible to block the on-going privatization process. Such an action could alienate 
voters and undermine Parliament's remaining power. 
5 .  The last stage began after the April referendum on Yeltsin's leadership. There was 
a change in the internal structure of Parliament and in the Committee on Economic 
Reform that made these bodies more anti-reformist. The formal attack on 
privatization began in May and June. Parliament demanded a resubrnission of the 
1992 privatization program or it would declare the program to be invalid. The 
people, however, were now firmly supporting privatization. The millions who had 
become shareholders would never accept the idea of giving up their ownership. 
To sum up, Mr. Chubais considered timing to be critical. If the government had not acted 
when it did in late 1991, there would never have been privatization in Russia. From 
December 1991 to mid-1992, there was a narrow window of opportunity for Parliamentary 
23 ETI Project, IIASA 
Enterprises and Reform in Russia Anatoly Chubais on General Issues of Privananzgtz'on 
approval of privatization. The window opened after the August 1991 coup when the 
Communist party had been absolutely discredited and destroyed. However, the window 
closed again when the party was reorganized in the summer of 1992. If privatization had not 
been started quickly by the executive, and if it had not given immediate benefit to millions 
of people, the process would have failed. The only chance to have privatization successfully 
introduced to Russia was during this small window of opportunity. 
Choices in the Privatl'zanzanon Program 
The economic decisions were largely shaped by the political situation. A few of the 
decisions are outlined here. The first decision was the choice between a case by case 
approach and simplified procedures. With moving quickly, the choice was clear: Russia 
needed fast and simple procedures for privatization. 
The second decision was the selection of the method to value the property for privatization. 
Western accountants provided considerable advice on how to value property, but their various 
methods were time-consuming and expensive. Simplified rules were needed and hence, it 
was decided to use valuations based on book values recorded in existing accounting records 
and then sell property through competitive procedures. 
A third decision was selecting a means of payment. Should privatization agencies accept 
only money or other forms of purchase as well? Using only money would have resulted in 
the privatization of only 50 to 100 companies because few Russians had enough cash assets 
to participate in money-only privatization. The use of vouchers made possible the 
privatization of the several thousand firms mentioned earlier. 
Vouchers also permitted all 150 million Russians to participate. This popular involvement 
created political pressure at both the Federal and local levels. Even a totally communist local 
government or regional council had voucher-holders in its territory. If the local governments 
tried to stop privatization, they would have had to explain to the media and to the voters why 
they would not allow people to use their vouchers. 
A fourth decision was whether to make vouchers tradable or to use individual privatization 
accounts as required by the 1991 privatization law. That law prohibited the sale of vouchers 
for three years. This restriction would have resulted in fragmented ownership. The sale of 
vouchers allowed the development of owners within the fifteen or twenty percent of the 
shares of a company. These large shareholders can play an active role in the decisions of 
the company. 
A fifth decision was the choice between a bottom-up or top-down process. Again there was 
only one sensible choice: a bottom-up approach. The initiative for privatization would come 
from the enterprise. The current law allows everyone to apply to the local office of the 
Privatization Ministry with a plan to purchase an enterprise. The application could come 
from an enterprise director, workers, or outsiders. There are only a limited list of reasons 
to reject a privatization proposal. 
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Indeed, privatization is not a decision of the government, but rather a decision of the 
Privatization Committee of each enterprise. Any company can be privatized unless it is on 
a short list of companies excluded from privatization. No special decision of the 
Privatization Ministry is required. 
A sixth decision related to the status of the Privatization Ministry: should it be a "normal" 
ministry or one holding all state property, able to make final decisions and have its own 
network of local offices all over the country? Again, the right answer was the latter 
alternative: the Privatization Ministry should not be bound by the restrictions of other 
ministries. 
This list of significant decisions could be expanded. The general point is that in these and 
other decisions, the political situation was the dominant factor. In discussing the economics 
of privatization, it is important to keep in mind political factors. Otherwise, the discussion 
is just theoretical. 
Criticism of Privatization 
There have been several criticisms of the privatization process that are not valid. 
Most often mentioned is the contention that privatization increases the level of crime and 
leaders of criminal organizations will become major owners of some companies. It is true 
that crime has increased in Russia. Yet comparing radical privatization with a gradual 
process, it does not seem to be sure that gradual privatization would result in less crime. A 
gradual process would allow ten or fifteen years in which there would be a potential for 
extensive corruption. 
There is also criticism that the privatization process interfered with foreign investment. It 
is said that a number of opportunities for foreign investment were lost because they did not 
fit into the privatization program. There are instances in which this is true. For instance 
there was a case in 1992 when a joint venture was stopped because the foreign participants 
wanted an individual decision from the government, and such an individual decision would 
have contradicted the general approach. In this example and in others, the privatization 
process may have delayed rather than stopped foreign participation. If this is so, the 
criticism loses some of its importance. 
A third criticism is that the privatization program did not create strategic investors, owners 
who would be active in the firm and bring new skills or capital to the enterprise. This 
criticism is heard every day in the Parliament. This criticism is not justified. There are 
many opportunities for strategic investors and there are numerous examples of strategic 
investors in particular companies. For example, one company just bought ten percent of the 
stocks in an auction of 500,000 shares. 
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Funrre Problem 
In Mr. Chubais' view, the main danger to the privatization program is the risk that some, 
or perhaps many, of the newly privatized enterprises will become bankrupt in the future. 
These bankruptcies will set off a new fight about whether privatization is a sensible policy 
for Russia. The Communists will say a bankrupt private company should be taken back by 
the state and subsidized to create a good company. 
It would be beneficial to create a privatization fund, an independent, non-governmental 
source of investment funds to tackle this problem. The Russian government now has a 
negative attitude towards supporting privatized enterprises, yet private f m s  face a more 
difficult economic situation than state enterprises. It is necessary to address this problem 
now before it becomes a major one. Investment funds for private enterprise would be a way 
to help privatized companies become more economically viable. 
The general point is that the only way to find the right answers about privatization is to 
recognize fully the importance of politics while maintaining a realistic economic program. 
Restructurin~ and Privatization in the Russian Federation 
During the present transition to a market economy in Russia, managers of large state 
enterprises are facing new challenges. The incentive structure, planning, and pricing strategy 
have all changed in one way or another with the collapse of the command economy. One of 
the major economic alterations that managers of state enterprises must face is privatization. 
With this fundamental reversion from past ideology, the motivation and consequently 
behavior of state managers changes both before their enterprises are privatized and after, 
should the same managers still be leading the firm as often proves to be the case in Russia. 
Without a doubt, all sectors will consequently undergo significant restructuring. 
Privm'mion: contribution to a new enterprise structure 
From an outsider's perspective, the privatization process of large Russian state enterprises 
may appear somewhat erratic, even haphazard at times. Nevertheless, both Westerners and 
Russians agree that the program is both amazingly swift and unprecedented; not to mention 
that it continues at an accelerating pace despite being besieged by opposition forces in the 
parliament . 
The final objective of privatization is to create effective market participants, who are profit- 
maximizers allowing the market to rely on their self-interest as private owners, in the Russian 
economy. This results in a crucial issue (as yet even unresolved in the West) - the separation 
of ownership and control. The problem arises due to the fact that a large enterprise needs 
to collect capital from a large number of individuals inevitably creating a sizeable body of 
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owners. These owners cannot operate or control the enterprise themselves and thus delegate 
this to managers they hire. The owners and managers must work together to be effective 
market participants. But this raises the next question of how a multitude of diverse 
shareholders (owners) can ensure managers act in the best interest of the group rather than 
follow tactics for individual success. There are a number of measures used in the West that 
include linking managers' incentives to those of owners, reliance on institutional investors, 
leveraged buy-out, and others, though none are without drawbacks. 
In essence, the whole system of privatization to facilitate restructuring relies on the 
assumption of welldeveloped financial markets both in the form of the stock market and 
availability of financial institutions that are willing to make large loans. The hardest problem 
for Russia is probably not privatization in the sense of transferring titles, but how to develop 
the set of allied institutions in making the post-privatized world work. This is a major 
determinant of the extent of restructuring one can expect. 
Due to the very rapid pace, the time is extremely limited for restructuring enterprises before 
privatization. In fact, this should turn out to be an advantage as the new structures will only 
be subsequently determined on the basis of market principles assuming, of course, the 
development of the necessary market conditions, incentives, and corporate governance. Ex- 
post restructuring based on market forces is clearly better than ex-ante adjustment in the 
administrative style characteristic of the Soviet past. The latter is simply a waste of scarce 
resources as it is impossible to precisely plan how the new market conditions will influence 
the existing structure, and the administrative modifications would also be subject to market 
orientation after privatization. 
At the ETI seminar, an evaluation presented by the Russian economist Sergey Vasiliev shed 
light on two main patterns of industrial restructuring presently taking place in the Russian 
Federation. The first pattern is the result of government policy and characterized by 
substantial direct intervention. The policy-makers are providing enterprises in several 
selected priority sectors with subsidies, special credits, and soft loans. Not only has this 
method proven to be inefficient, but the enterprises have begun to abuse the privileges rather 
than utilize the resources for restructuring purposes. The second pattern of restructuring is 
one characteristic of enterprises that do not have access to any directed state allocations or 
even preferential treatment by commercial banks. However, according to Vasiliev, it is this 
group of enterprises that has been more successful in restructuring and adapting to the new 
and continually fluctuating market conditions emerging in the Russian economy. 
One measure used to identify the extent of restructuring is the share of investment in gross 
domestic product; this ratio has reached a favorable 20% already. Although this figure may 
instill some assurance in the minds of Russian policy-makers, several Western economic 
analysts at the seminar questioned whether it may be inflated due to the investment in 
unneeded or involuntary inventory increases as a consequence of the sluggish development 
of reliable market environment and distribution channels, as well as of excessively high 
inflation. 
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Obstacles influencing the impact of privatization 
There was a general feeling at the seminar that privatization of large state enterprises in 
Russia has not been able to substantially influence the behavior of many managers to make 
their firms more market responsive or, even more fundamentally, to act according to market 
principles.I8 Neither was there the impression that privatization had achieved the extent of 
restructuring of industry that was previously expected, at least not until this time. The 
reason for this is the reliance of the success of privatized firms on the success of the overall 
economic reform. The latter is proceeding, but not without problems, contradictions, and 
often hesitation. 
Russian experts have identified four obstacles that are perceived to be chiefly responsible for 
the lack of impact privatization has had on inducing industries and enterprises to restructure. 
Firstly, there is the issue of property rights, both physical and intellectual. These rights must 
be clarified, expressly defined, and protected. They must be anchored in and supported by 
the necessary changes in the legal and law enforcement systems. Without adequate respect 
for property rights, real ownership and the motivations associated with it will continue to 
elude the enterprise entrepreneurs. Additionally, privatization continues to be slowed by 
uncertainty concerning actual ownership and the rights and obligations that go with it; the 
result often being a type of informal privatization that is frequently subject to corrupt 
activities. Furthermore, much needed long-term and especially foreign investment will be 
reluctant to materialize as long as rights and practices concerning property remain 
questionable and unpredictable. So, if ambiguity regarding property rights persists and thus 
inhibits privatization and investment, then restructuring will have a more difficult time to 
become pervasive throughout the economy. 
The need for a legal framework conducive to the functioning of a market economy is not 
only a prerequisite for successful privatization, but also for life after privatization. Laws 
and strict enforcement, probably combined with penalties of differing severity depending on 
the offence, are desperately required to induce entrepreneurs to honor contractual 
agreements. The lack of such laws and even more the ability of offenders to avoid 
punishment or just getting caught, using bribes and other illicit means, has led to a 
substantial amount of barter trade and informal agreements. All are factors that prevent 
restructuring due to the reduced willingness of managers to put gentlemen's agreements, 
which may be their only (though unstable) source of supply, at risk. 
The second obstacle is the absence of an all-encompassing financial environment that is 
required by enterprises in a market economy. While it is clear that such institutions and 
infrastructure cannot appear overnight, it is certainly impressive how quickly such institutions 
have developed in Russia since President Yeltsin's reform effort began. Yet, there is a long 
way to go. Reducing inflation and eliminating subsidies to enterprises are essential as one 
fuels the other. Besides, the subsidies are frequently cited as the reason for non-market 
l8 Probably not surprising considering the inconsistent legislation and the pubescence of the market system. 
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restructuring of industry, indicating that enterprises responding to these signals will become 
increasing inviable in the future market economy and forcing them to request always more 
subsidies to survive. Of course, cutting subsidies and restrictive monetary policy calls for 
a functioning banking system in which commercial banks will base loans on the 
creditworthiness of clients rather than on traditional links or their perceived importance for 
national esteem. Reduced inflation will lower lending rates and allow long-term planning, 
both ingredients for industrial restructuring after privatization. Also, there will be less 
support for the privatization process on the part of managers if they see their opportunities 
to obtain investment loans deteriorating once they are a private firm. 
Thirdly, all remaining price distortions must be removed. These currently exist in the 
transition phase of development due to some remaining regulation of foreign trade and some 
remaining fixed prices. The distortions not only hamper the ability of potential investors in 
the privatization of an enterprise to conduct a meaningful evaluation, but also impede the 
potential for full-scale profit-oriented management under the then only quasi-market 
conditions. At the ETI seminar, some Russian economists stressed that the lasting 
unpredictability of price distortions is now one of the main obstacles to active restructuring. 
Fourthly, a high priority is the creation of a competitive environment which entails equal 
business opportunities for all market participants. Surprisingly, the main obstacle to the 
creation of competition is not the high degree of monopolization in the Russian economy. 
If a so-called administrative monopoly is not directly granted special authority by the state, 
the former usually has too little power to impose its will on participants of the market. The 
Russian state cannot and should not hope to create competition for various monopolistic 
producers that still do exist by establishing additional state enterprises in the same sector. 
Nevertheless, in an effort to decentralize the decision-making authority and encourage 
increased entrepreneurial activity, the latest decree of the Russian government gives local 
authorities the power to grant licensing of economic activities in almost all sectors with 
localized markets. Russian experts predict that with the appropriate market conditions most 
privatized enterprises will adjust and even move into new fields of activity, creating 
competition for other enterprises already active in that particular branch. 
The Russian experts at the ETI seminar believed that the great majority of restructuring 
would take place without having to revert to bankruptcy. In fact, the law on bankruptcy was 
only implemented on 1 March 1993. As yet the courts have little experience with the 
bankruptcy procedures and the process could take up to 3 years to complete. However, it 
is not only unique to Russia that creditors do not usually jump at the first chance to take 
advantage of bankruptcy of an enterprise that owes them substantial sums. In fact, Western 
economists at the seminar stated that bankruptcy may not in itself be as important as the 
threat of bankruptcy in influencing the incentive structure. This impact would make 
enterprises focus on the profit rather than on the output, and on the longer rather than shorter 
term outlook for restructuring. 
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Privatization in Eastern Europe: Relevant Experiences 
Privatization, when studied in the three countries which have advanced most in this effort 
(the Czech and the Slovak Republics, Hungary, and Poland), conveys important examples 
of privatization practices. There are interesting systemic similarities, but also significant 
differences. 
In theory, all the privatization methods or techniques were available. However, since 
privatization was an important part of the overall reform package, which differed from 
country to country, the portfolio of methods used also differed. For example, in the former 
CSFR where over 95 % of the enterprises were state owned (in this respect similar to Russia) 
and where no large attempts were made under the command economy to commercialize the 
enterprises, a political decision was made to radically privatize "en masse" by issuing 
vouchers. l9 
In Hungary on the other hand, all methods of privatization were accepted except voucher 
privatization because of the valid dictum "that a new real owner should pay for the acquired 
pr~perty".~' In Poland, where several different methods of privatization have been used since 
1986, it took several years of discussion until the President signed the creation of National 
Investment Funds and their privatization act in the scope of the Mass Privatization Program. 
It is interesting to note that those countries which already began to experiment with the "de- 
etatization" (i.e., disengaging the state from business affairs) before 1989 (Hungary and 
Poland) were more cautious with privatization than a country which applied the command 
economy until the last moment (CSFR). 
Czech and Slovak ~epublicz' 
Privatization in the former CSFR was seen as a crucial component of the reform package 
(together with stabilization and liberalization). The most important constituents of the 
privatization strategy were restitution, small scale privatization, and the privatization of large 
state enterprises. In the course of restitution, more than 100,000 restitution claims were 
settled, while in the framework of small-scale privatization close to 30,000 small f m s  were 
auctioned. 
l9 See the paper by Michal MejsHc (A Rapid Privatization as a Vital Part of Czech Tran$om'on) prepared 
for the seminar. 
20 See the paper by Mihay Laki ( n e  Post-socialist State as Seller of Enterprises and Other State Owned 
Assets) presented at the ETI seminar. 
21 This part of the report is based mostly on the paper by Michal Mejstfik. 
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For large scale privatization, all methods were eligible (competitive bids, direct sales, public 
auctions and tenders, etc.) but most specifically the voucher system was developed. This 
system was selected because, according to the results of discussions between "gradualists" 
and "radicals", the other methods even when combined could not secure the requested speed 
of privatization andlor could have passed a significant portion of the state property to 
politically unacceptable groups of the population. The Czechoslovak government passed a law 
on large privatization in February 199 1 which intended to privatize 4,000 out of 6,000 large 
state enterprises and state farms in two waves. 
Much popular support was given to voucher privatization. In this scheme, each citizen over 
18 years of age had the opportunity to buy investment vouchers: 1,000 points of investment 
money with limited maturity for a fee of CSK 1,000 (USD 34 at the time). This entitled him 
or her to bid for the ownership of shares of any company privatized by the voucher method 
or allocate hidher points to an investment fund. Investment funds in turn would make 
investment decisions for their clients and hold a diversified portfolio. 
The response to this privatization opportunity was twice as large as originally anticipated by 
those who elaborated the scheme: nearly 75% of the eligible citizens participated (8.56 
million). Needless to say that such support also had a significant political impact and 
consequences. 
The privatization of large enterprises had two phases: 
1. Elaboration, evaluation, and approval of privatization projects under the 
control of the Ministry of Privatization; 
2. Implementation of approved projects by the government or the Ministry of 
Privatization. 
The property of an enterprise with an approved privatization project was transferred to the 
specially created Fund of National Property (FNP) which has the responsibility to manage 
the enterprise until the ownership is transferred to private owners. 
In order to ensure greater objectivity, anyone could submit a privatization project. Thus, for 
the privatization of some companies many projects have been proposed for selection. As of 
mid January 1993, the Czech Ministry of Privatization evaluated nearly 8,600 of the 1 1,300 
submitted projects in the first wave. Approximately 2,000 projects have been approved for 
privatization in the first wave, creating nearly 4,000 new business units. Out of this total, 
8.6 % have been approved for public auction, 7.9 % for public tender, 25.7 % for direct sale, 
26.3 % for commercialization into joint-stock structure, 4.9% for the privatization of existing 
state-owned joint-stock companies, and 26.6% for unpaid transfer to municipalities, pension 
funds, banks, etc. 
The Slovak Republic received about 1,500 privatization projects for 736 f m s  in the first 
wave, of which 430 have been approved. By late November 1992, 879 projects were 
approved. 188 of these were selected for direct sale, 20 for public auction, 10 for public 
tenders, 7 for restitution, 95 for unpaid transfer, and the remaining 544 were singled out for 
voucher privatization. Projects which were not approved in time for the first wave will be 
included in the second wave. 
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A lesser known core of the voucher privatization process is the large computer network 
supporting various rounds of the first wave. Because citizens were free to select companies 
to which they devoted their vouchers, it was likely that some companies would not get 
enough investment points while others would face oversubscription. On the base of excess 
demand and excess supply recorded by the computerized network, share prices were adjusted 
for the second round (prices for undersubscribed companies falling and rising for those 
oversubscribed) by a special price-setting committee appointed by the Federal Ministry of 
Finance. This was an important auxiliary activity substituting for the non-existent stock 
exchange. The fist  wave of voucher privatization needed five rounds which lasted from May 
18 to December 2, 1992. 
By and large, voucher privatization can be described as being successful. Nevertheless, some 
interesting experiences have been acquired which could be of interest to other reforming 
countries. 
1. Because the process was new, it could not be legally prepared to the last detail and 
many laws and regulations had to be amended or newly created in the course of the 
process. 
For example, it was a great surprise that Investment Privatization Funds (IPF) 
(private joint-stock companies themselves) mushroomed and played a dominant role 
in the allocation of investment points. Two-thirds of the citizens involved in the 
voucher scheme transferred all their points (and an additional 420,000 of citizens 
transferred their points partially) to various IPFs. The combined ratio of points 
allocated to IPFs amounted to 72 % of total points. About 56 % of all the points were 
allocated to the ten largest funds. Originally there was no regulation on the behavior 
of IPFs. Only as late as April 28, 1992 was a law passed that set forth some rules 
(disclosure rule, diversification requirements, prevention of conflict of interests, etc.). 
2. A key step in the privatization process is the elaboration of the projects. Here 
management was in an advantageous position: they could hide crucial information 
concerning their enterprise from others who wanted to prepare competing projects. 
Therefore, an amendment to the Law on Large Privatization was prepared and passed 
in February 1992 to make similar conduct punishable. By that time, however, two- 
thirds of the projects approved had been submitted by enterprise managers. 
As could be expected there were many other problems such as the evaluation of f m s '  
market value, transparency of rules for projects evaluation, etc. All these experiences were 
used to improve the second wave of voucher privatization starting in September 1993. 
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The pressure to privatize large companies in Hungary was not a result of popular desire but 
influence coming from abroad, and competing programs of newly emerging political parties 
played a predominant role. It was clear that Hungary's chance to join important international 
organizations (EC, EFTA) depended, among others, on the position and role of the private 
sector. Also, promises and programs of the political parties, as well as the growing budget 
deficit, contributed to the desire to privatize. The current government of Hungary declared 
a target to reduce the share of the state sector to below 50% by the end of its mandate (April 
1994). 
Indicators of privatization show that privatization gained momentum in Hungary after 1989. 
The number of private firms (mainly small artisans) increased from 32,000 in 1989 to 
600,000 in 1992. At the same time, the number of limited liability companies increased from 
14,400 to 62,200. The majority of these are small companies with no growth potential. The 
number of so-called "shadow firms", which serve for tax evasion only and have no 
producive activity at all, is also large. 
The privatization of large and medium size state owned companies started in 1987-1989. This 
early privatization was not much more than "rough privatization"; a situation in which the 
creation of joint stock companies were a reincarnation of the state owned original, or various 
state owned companies, banks, and local governments would retain a dominant share. Out 
of approximately 2,000 companies in 1988, 602 were transformed by the end of 1992, and 
the State Property Agency (SPA) has a 60% share in the assets of these c~mpanies.~ The 
foreign investor's share in these companies is 5%. Accordingly, in spite of an increasing 
private sector, a decisive part of "privatized" large and medium size companies have in fact 
a mixed structure of property with a majority share held by the SPA. 
As far as the further progress of privatization is concerned, it is difficult to make predictions. 
There are several factors negatively influencing privatization like the deep economic 
recession with a dramatic decline of industrial output and an increasing number of enterprises 
finding themselves in the red. Also, the impact of less controllable factors such as tradition, 
ideology, availability of entrepreneurial skills, and the benefits of the illegal economy have 
been growing. A warning signal on the performance of the privatization process is that the 
total budgetary revenue from privatization in 1992 was only 57.1 % of the level expected, and 
the SPA expects even less revenue in 1993. 
In order to understand the forces at work in privatization without a formal model it is useful 
to use behavioral analogies. These can be applied for the description of the potential behavior 
of the actors in privatization, especially the government. 
22 This part of the report is based mostly on the paper by Mihay Laki. 
The coverage of originally state owned firms is not complete, since some firms ceased to exist, some were 
split up, and some were completely privatized, so that the SPA has no share in them at all. 
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One can use the analogy of: 
(a) going out of business, and/or 
@) testamentary dispositions for ownership transfer. 
The first analogy is relevant because the state has to sell its enterprises in a worsening market 
position announcing the necessity of selling certain assets by a particular date, as is common 
in clearance sales. In this case buyers expect extra discounts. The Hungarian state announced 
the time period (24  years) and volume (at least 50% but not more than 70% of state assets) 
for sale. Huge enterprise debts, immobile stocks, underutilized capacities and efforts to avoid 
bankruptcy all substantiate the "going out of business" scenario as a relevant analogy. The 
clearance sale position, however, contradicts many targets the Hungarian state seeks to follow 
during privatization such as the maximization of revenues from privatization. Given the 
multitude of conflicts between aims and reality we can safely assume that the going out of 
business would be a much longer than envisaged process, most probably at least a decade, 
for the Hungarian government. 
The analogy of the testamentary dispositions can be substantiated if we take into account how 
many details are prescribed for the new (private) owner by the old owner (the state) about 
the way he is supposed to run the privatized property. The most frequent dispositions are to 
maintain the former pattern of production, to prescribe where to buy inputs, and to prevent 
lay-offs. The SPA can designate many other targets for privatization like the creation of a 
more competitive market. The formulation of a multitude of dispositions, while 
understandable, spoils the transparency of the privatization process. It also creates a situation 
that attracts subjectivism, corruption, and non-accountability of the privatization agency. 
During the first stage of privatization in 1986--89, the objective was to break up the 
monopoly of state ownership. Practical steps to achieve this met strong opposition because 
of unclear selection criteria for privatization, unclear asset valuation, and hidden preferences 
for management, party members and state apparatus. 
In October 1989, the comprehensive program for transformation and stabilization, the 
"Balcerowicz Plan", assumed a fast and radical ownership transformation. Despite 
expectations for radical changes, the corresponding measures were delayed for almost a year. 
In the discussions that were the cause of the delay, four privatization methods were 
considered: 
1. Commercial privatization through the capital market; 
2. Privatization through employee ownership; 
3. Privatization through citizen ownership; and, 
4. Privatization by institutional investors. 
This part of the report is based on the paper presented at the seminar by Marek Dabrowski (Barbara 
Blaszczyik and Marek Dabrowski: lh Privatization Process in Poland). 
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Meanwhile, actual privatizations were started along the different paths of privatization: on 
the capital path, two different paths of liquidation, and commercialization. Only later did 
the focus of interest shift from commercial privatization to the concept of citizen ownership 
with the goal of speeding-up privatization. When the Mazowiecki government was replaced 
with the Bielecki government (in January 199 1) a compromise project was worked out which 
combined the idea of citizen ownership with the role of institutional investors. After some 
modification, Minister Lewandowski (Ministry of Ownership Changes) presented the Mass 
Privatization Project (MPP) based on this principle. 
This project gives all adult citizens the opportunity to own an equal stake in privatized 
companies through the acquisition (for a nominal fee) of certificates which are later 
convertible into the shares of the National Investment Funds (NIF), organized as joint stock 
companies. There will be a maximum of 20 investment funds. Several hundreds of large and 
medium sized companies will be involved with a total book value of PLZ 150 trillion, 
approximately USD 150 billion. The selection of companies for this type of privatization will 
be approved by the Council of Ministers. 
The shareholding structure will be as follows: 
33 % held by "lead" NIF; 
27% distributed equally to all NIF's; 
25 % retained by the State Treasury; and 
15 % distributed free of charge to employees. 
The MPP was approved on May 18, 1993. However, the real start of the program needs 
further decision by the parliament. 
As far as already implemented privatizations are concerned, the transformation of 2,387 (out 
of 8,454) state enterprises was started from the beginning of privatization (August 1990) to 
the end of November 1992; four-fifths of them were non-agricultural f m s .  Out of this 
number of enterprises 481 (24.6%) are being transformed into capital companies 
(commercialized) and the rest (1,474 companies) are to be privatized through liquidation. 
Out of the 481 commercialized enterprises, 298 were selected for individual capital 
privatization and 183 for mass privatization. Privatization was completed in only 49 cases 
by the capital method and 500 through liquidation. In the rest of the enterprises, 
transformation is either in a transitory phase or has achieved only formal changes. The latter 
applies mostly to companies that were commercialized, but all the shares remained in the 
hands of the state treasury. Capital privatization is most used in industry (53%), while in 
trade and construction privatization through liquidation dominates (60% and 56.4%). 
With the mass privatization just beginning and re-privatization legislation pending in Poland, 
interesting developments are to be expected. As the general economic situation improves, 
public opinion slowly shifts in favor of privatization. Public surveys record, however, that 
a decisive part of the population is against the privatization of the largest enterprises and is 
hostile towards foreign ownership. While the more entrepreneurial behavior of privatized 
business is detectable, it is still premature to forecast whether the expected microeconomic, 
macroeconomic, and societal goals of privatization will be fulfilled. 
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Enterprise Behavior under the Conditions of Economic Refonn 
in the Russian Federation 
and 
Privananzanzanon of Large State Enterprises in the Russian Federation 
held at IIASA on 6-8 and 9-10 July 1993 
Alexashenko, Sergey and Nabiullina, Elvira: Enterprises in Transition: New Models of Behavior. 
Boffito, Carlo: Outline of the paper on Financial Structure and Privatization. 
Dabrowski, Marek and Blaszczyk, Barbara: Ihe Privatization Process in Poland. 
Dolgopiatova, Tatiana: Enterprises' Relations. 
Ickes, Barry W. and Ryterman, Randi: Roadblock to Economic Reform: Inter-Enterprise Debt and the 
Transition to Markers. 
Ickes, Barry W., R y t e m ,  Randi and Brown, Annette N.: Ihe Myth of Monopoly: A New View of Industrial 
Structure in Russia. 
Kiselyov, Denis: Enterprise Response to Changes in the Foreign Trade Regulations in the Course of Russian 
Economic Reform. 
Laki, Mihaly: Ihe Post-Socialist State as Seller of Enterprises and Other State Owned Assets. 
MejstV.lk, Michal: Enterprise Restructuring and its Economic Precondition in the Czech Republic. 
MejstVKk, Michal: A Rapid Enterprise Privatization as a Vital Part of Czech Transformation. 
Shironin, Viacheslav: State Enterprise Behavior Under Economic Reform. Changes in Managerial Attitudes 
and Objectives. 
Tait, Alan: Enterprise Behavior Under Conditions of Economic Growth in the Russian Federation: Taration. 
Telyukov, Alexander: Social Welfare and the Enterprise. 
Thieme, Jerzy: Ihe Polish Mass Privatization Programme: Overview. 
Uno, Kimio: Competitiveness of Russian Industry and Conditions for Sector-SpeclJic Policy Measures. 
Uno, Kimio: On "Suggestions for Economic Reform in Russia". 
Vasiliev, Sergey A.: Environmental vs. Institutional Factors of Restructuring. 
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Programs for the Seminars 
Enterprise Behavior under the Conditions of 
Economic Reform in the Russian Federation 
Seminar Room, IIASA, 6-8 July 1993 
Tuesday, 6 July 
13:30 REGISTRATION 
14:OO OPENING REMARKS 
Peter de Jhosi ,  Director, IIASA 
14:15 INTRODUCTION 
J h o s  G ~ c s ,  Economic Transition and Integration Project 
SESSION I: General Issues --- Chair: Jdnos Gdcs 
14~30 CHANGES IN MANAGERIAL ATTITUDES AND OBJECTIVES 
Managers' Views on Reform: Price and Trade Liberalization. Abolition of Central 
Planning, State Allocation of Materials and Mandatory State Orders 
Enterprise Activity in Emerging Commodity and Currency Exchanges 
New Managerial Goals and Priorities 
New Concepts of Ownership; Who is Possessing Ownership Rights? 
Paper: Viacheslav Shironin Discussant: Randi Ryterman 
Interactions with Banks, Local Authorities, Legislative and Executive Branches of 
Central Government 
Role of Employer Association, Trade Unions, and Extra-Republic Partners 
Characteristics of Buyer, Supplier, Customer, and Distributor Relations 
Emerging Competition on the Product Market 
Paper: Tatiana Dolgopiatova Discussant: John Anderson 
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Wednesday, 7 July 
SESSION 11: Financial Issues --- Chair Petr Aven 
9:00 FUNDING THE ENTERPRISE 
Types of Money and Credit, the Role of Earmarked Credits 
Budget Constraint on Enterprises 
Credit and Property Relationships vis-a-vis the Banking System, Ownership Ties 
Among Enterprises and Banks 
Payments Arrangements and Inter-Enterprise Indebtedness 
Investment by Enterprises into Assets, Hard Currency, etc. 
Sales of Assets to Finance Current Activities 
Paper: Barry lckes Discussant: Anders Aslund 
Efficiency of Various Taxes in terms of Incentive and Distribution Impacts. Value 
Added, Social Security, Enterprise Profit, and Export Taxes 
Further Factors in Evaluating Various Taxes---Political Acceptability, Legislative 
Approval, Ease of Administration and Collection 
Role of Central and Local Governments in Enterprise Taxation 
Enterprise Tax Avoidance and Evasion 
Paper: Alan Tait Discussants: Sergei Alexashenko and 
Marek Dabrowski 
12:30 Lunch 
SESSION m: Foreign Trade --- Chair: Anders kslund 
The Impact of Export Taxes, Licenses, Surrender of Export Revenue, Tariff 
Exemptions, and Bilateral Agreements 
Access to and Utilization of Hard Currency 
Capital Flight 
The Effects of Foreign Trade Regulations on Structural Change 
The Exchange Rate 
The Openness and Accessibility of Foreign Markets, the Infrastructure of Foreign 
Trade 
Paper: Denis Kiselyov Discussant: Petr Aven 
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SESSION IV: Social Welfare and the Enterprise --- Chaic Anders hlund 
Enterprise Provision of Housing, Health Care, Canteens, Stores, and Other Social 
Services 
Unemployment and Social Infrastructure, In-house Unemployment 
Role of Families, Unions, Worker Collectives, and Local and Central Governments 
in the Provision of Social Services as an Alternative to the Enterprise 
Paper: Alexander Telyukov Discussant: Martin Rein 
Thursday, 8 July 
SESSION V: Enterprise Behavior in a Comparative Perspective 
--- Chair Il'dar Karimov 
Decline in Output and Employment 
Inflation and the Enterprise Response to Stabilization Measures 
Structural Adjustment of Industry to the Free Market 
New Managerial Priorities 
Papers: Wtadystaw Jermakowicz and Michal Mejstiik 
11:00 SUMMARY: LESSONS FOR RUSSIA AND OTHER "NEWCOMERS" 
Presentation: Jdnos Gdcs 
12:OO Close of Seminar 
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Entcrpriscs and Rcfonn in Russia 
Privatization of Large State Enterprises 
in the Russian Federation 
Seminar Room, IIASA, 9-10 July 1993 
Friday, 9 July 
8:45 REGISTRATION 
9:00 OPENING REMARKS 
Peter de Jbosi, Director, IIASA 
9: 15 INTRODUCTION 
Merton J. Peck, Economic Transition and Integration Project 
9:30 SESSION I: GENERAL ISSUES --- Chaic Sergei Vasiliev 
Large State Enterprises in Russia: Recent Developments 
Present State and Recent Developments in Privatization 
The Official Doctrine and Alternative Proposals 
Plans and Forecasts for Future Progress 
Presentation: Anatoly Chubais 
Paper: Alexander Abramov Discussants: John S. Earle and 
Ardy Stoutjesdijk 
12:30 Lunch 
14:30 SESSION 2: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT --- Chaic Kimio Urn 
Major Players and their Interests: Managers, Workers, Independent Participants, 
Local and Central Governments, and the General Public 
Who Initiates the Privatization: Bottom-up or Top-down? 
Nominal and Real Property Rights 
Egalitarian Principles and Effective Corporate Control 
Presentation: Jerzy Thieme 
Paper: Alexander Ageev Discussant: Barry lckes 
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Saturday, 10 July 
9:00 SESSION 3: RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION --- Chaic Marek Dabrowski 
Split-up and Spin-off 
Promoting Competition 
The Role of Credits and Subsidies 
Sequencing Bankruptcy in the Process of Privatization 
Paper: Sergei Vasiliev 
Paper: Carlo Boffito 
Discussant: John Anderson 
Discussant: Il'dar Karimov 
12:30 Lunch 
14:30 SESSION 4: EAST EUROPEAN EXPERIENCES --- Chair: Petr 0. Aven 
Privatization Techniques 
Building Political Support 
The Role of Foreign Capital 
Behavior Patterns of Newly Privatized Enterprises 
Paper: Michal Mejstrik 
Paper: Marek Dabrowski 
Paper: MihAly Laki 
18:OO Close of Seminar 
Discussant: Andreas Worgotter 
Discussant: GAbor Hunya 
Discussant: April Harding 
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